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Even though the Federal Aviation Administration determined a software issue on Boeing’s 737 MAX does not pose a safety risk, some in the industry are concerned that the glitch increases pilots’ workloads during the crucial moments before landing.
The software glitch shuts off part of an automated flight control system, known as vertical navigation, or VNAV, in certain circumstances when pilots deviate from their pre-programmed flight path. It occurs when pilots are preparing for a second landing after they performed a go-around, which is to abort a landing, bring the plane back up, circle and then try to land again.
In those situations, the software glitch shuts off VNAV and pilots must reboot part of the system and reprogram a flight path for the next landing.
Boeing has said the software issue is not a safety risk because pilots are trained to fly without those automated flight controls. The planemaker is working on a permanent software update to fix the issue, but that solution may not be available until 2028. In the meantime, it is working with airlines to develop a procedure for responding to the glitch.
The FAA determined this month the software glitch was not a safety risk because pilots maintain control of the aircraft and indications to the flight crew about the issue are “clear and unambiguous.”
Still, for some in the aerospace industry, the answer isn’t that simple.
“We can’t contest the fact that pilots can work through the anomaly; an airplane is not going to go down because of this. But what it does do is introduce a risk in the cockpit that is not necessary,” said Dennis Tajer, a pilot with American Airlines and spokesperson for the airlines' union, the Allied Pilots Association.
Tajer estimates pilots would have to take about seven additional steps to prepare for their next landing after the software glitch occurs. That would essentially take one of the pilots out of commission for an unknown period of time while they reboot the system and reload the flight path, Tajer said.
The Air Line Pilots Association, which represents pilots from several different airlines, agreed that the procedure puts extra workload on pilots. But, in an interview with The Seattle Times, representatives from the union said the workaround is manageable.
This is another reminder of why two pilots on the flightdeck are essential to airline operations," ALPA president Jason Ambrosi said in a statement. "One flies the aircraft while the other monitors and manages automation issues like this one.”
Boeing spokesperson Bobbie Egan said pilots can perform Boeing's recommended steps at anytime between the missed approach and before preparing for the second landing, including "during the normal sequence of programming" the aircraft's flight management computer, or FMC. Those steps then "ensure that the FMC performs as expected," Egan said.
Tajer, though, worries that the extra steps could push pilots toward "task saturation."
“Is this a five-alarm fire? No,” he said. “But it’s a fire.”
Evaluating human factors
Many airlines flying the 737 MAX today are operating an earlier version of the software. It's unclear how many aircraft are currently affected by the software glitch, so the focus has been on two new MAX variants that will have the affected software.
The FAA recently certified Boeing’s 737 MAX 7 and Boeing expects the regulator will soon certify the 737 MAX 10. If the FAA had determined there was a safety concern, the glitch could have disrupted the first MAX 7 deliveries and delayed MAX 10 certification.
In its determination that the VNAV issue does not pose a safety risk, FAA test pilots mimicked the software glitch in a flight simulator, a spokesperson for the regulator said in a recent interview. Test pilots are trained to evaluate how airline pilots may respond to an issue during flight, the spokesperson continued.
“It was important for us to experience it directly, to have firsthand experience of the workload, rather than just rely on a written analysis or something from Boeing,” the spokesperson said.
The FAA also collected feedback from airlines on two operator calls with hundreds of participants, including some 737 MAX pilots, the spokesperson said. That call took place after Boeing notified operators of the bug in an August letter and was separate from the safety review board the FAA convened to determine if the new bug posed a safety risk.
Still, Tajer and Najmedin Meshkati, an engineering professor at the University of Southern California, worry that Boeing and the FAA did not accurately consider the experience of “line pilots,” or pilots in the field, relying too heavily on input from test pilots.
Test pilots are a good first step, Meshkati said, but they are well-rested and expecting the disruption.
Meshkati, who previously served on an FAA-convened expert panel to study Boeing’s safety culture following two deadly 737 MAX crashes in 2018 and 2019, said the recent software issue raises concerns over human factors similar to those that came up after the fatal crashes.
In certifying the MAX before it entered service, Boeing misjudged how airline pilots would react to a flight control system malfunction on the aircraft. In both crashes, a faulty software system, known as the Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System, or MCAS, repeatedly forced the plane’s nose down, leaving pilots unable to control the aircraft.
The two software issues are not related; FAA administrator Bryan Bedford told reporters last month that unlike MCAS, the VNAV software issue "doesn't take control away from the pilots.
But Meshkati was worried about similarities in the assumptions Boeing and the FAA made when analyzing how pilots would behave.
Among many findings, the panel Meshkati served on concluded in 2024 that Boeing had diminished the role of “human factors,” or the science of analyzing how people behave and react. Boeing has since worked on rebuilding that focus, including appointing a human factors chief engineer in January 2025, but Meshkati worries about how effective those changes have been.
“If this reform is taking hold, how did a flight management software update that can drop the autopilot’s vertical guidance during a go-around, one of the highest workload moments in flight, reach airline service?” Meshkati wrote in an email.
He pointed to another 2024 finding that, he said, “may apply here: organizational changes at Boeing that existed ‘on paper’ but were not yet reflected in how the work actually got done.”
“A new organizational chart is not a new safety culture,” Meshkati wrote. “What matters is whether human factors has the authority to stop or change a design, and whether pilots’ concerns reach decision-makers.”
In a February interview with Aviation Week, Boeing's human factors chief engineer Nicholas Patrick said the company knows it needs to “keep pilots in the loop” on future designs.
“It’s one thing to say it,” Patrick said in the interview, “It’s another thing to design it into the aircraft.”
A ‘wired-in flaw’
Not all aviation safety experts share Tajer and Meshkati’s level of concern. John Cox, a pilot and longtime aviation safety expert, told The Seattle Times this month, immediately after the FAA's safety review, that he found the decision “reasonable.”
It's important for pilots to be aware of the software issue and possible outcomes, Cox continued, but it does not risk the safety of the flight.
Hassan Shahidi, president and CEO of the Flight Safety Foundation, said in an interview with The Seattle Times that Boeing should address the issue “proactively” and all airlines should conduct their own safety risk assessment of the software issue. But those steps are “out of an abundance of caution,” he continued.
“The regulator has already said this is not a safety issue, but it's a prudent thing for airlines to do,” Shahidi said, adding that “there will be lessons learned, in terms of the design process,” to prevent it from happening again in the future.
Tajer acknowledged that the issue may be resolved by the time American Airlines starts flying the MAX 10; it's not expecting its first delivery until 2029, he said.
But just like a consumer would not pay for a brand-new car with a known problem, Boeing and the FAA shouldn’t sign off on the yet-to-be-certified MAX 10 with a known anomaly, he argued.
He pointed to an instance nearly three years ago where Boeing asked the FAA for permission to certify the MAX 7 before it resolved an issue with the plane’s engine anti-ice system. Boeing rescinded that request after a panel flew off an Alaska Airlines MAX 9, raising concerns about Boeing’s manufacturing practices.
Tajer wants Boeing to follow a similar playbook now.
“Right now, we have a flight system that has an already wired-in flaw,” he said.
“We may learn something going forward with engagement with Boeing and the FAA that changes our mind, but at this point, what we understand about it, gives us cause for concern.”
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